Alston & Bird Consumer Finance Blog

Mortgage Loans

Agencies Raise Appraisal Threshold Exemption

A&B ABstract:

A new rule from the federal banking regulators reduces the number of residential mortgage transactions for which an appraisal is required.  The rule also incorporates changes to federal appraisal requirements made by the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act of 2018.

On September 27, 2019, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (the “Agencies”) issued a much-anticipated Final Rule increasing the threshold below which an appraisal is not required for a residential mortgage transaction from $250,000 to $400,000.  (The announcement parallels a similar increase in the de minimis thresholds for commercial transactions that the Agencies announced in April 2018.)  The rule takes effect October 9, 2019 (the day after publication in the Federal Register), except as otherwise noted below.

Background

The Agencies first promulgated regulations and guidance required by Title XI of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (“FIRREA”) in 1994.  While FIRREA generally requires a regulated lending institution to obtain an appraisal to support any “federally related transaction,” the Agencies have identified more than a dozen categories of appraisals that are exempt.  Until the recent rule adoptions, the $250,000 de minimis threshold had remained unchanged since its creation.

Impact of the Rule

The Final Rule does not impact the requirement that a regulated lending institution obtain an evaluation of the property, consistent with the Agencies’ regulations and the Interagency Appraisal and Evaluation Guidelines, for transactions below the de minimis threshold.  Notably, broker price opinions and automated valuation models (“AVMs”), which FIRREA separately addresses, among the valuation products that do not meet that standard.

In addition, the Final Rule creates a new exemption from the appraisal requirement.  Consistent with the Regulatory Relief Act, effective January 1, 2020, the Agencies will no longer require an appraisal for a rural residential mortgage loan transaction that meet the qualifications set forth in 12 U.S.C. § 3356.

Finally, effective January 1, 2020, the Final Rule requires that appraisals performed in connection with federally related transactions be subject to appropriate review for compliance with the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice.

Takeaway:

The increased appraisal exemption thresholds are welcome news for the residential and commercial mortgage markets.  The augmented exemption will be especially helpful to originators of smaller loans (such as second-lien home equity lines of credit) and fix/flip, non-owner-occupied loans that typically have smaller transaction values.  However, lenders should note the requirements for evaluations (still required for exempt transactions) – a topic that is drawing increased attention.

CSBS’s State Examination System Coming Soon

A&B ABstract

The Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) revolutionized state licensing with the National Mortgage Licensing System (NMLS) by providing a more uniform approach to state licensing of non-bank financial services companies.  CSBS will bring a similar transformation to supervising such companies.

The New State Examination System

CSBS designed the State Examination System (SES) to be an end-to-end system for scheduling a single or multi-state examination to completion; the system can also be used for investigations, enforcement actions and complaints.

Within the SES, regulators will be able to access an agency library of resources, track examination time and expenses, prepare and send information requests, and engage in collaborative scheduling.  Compliance and examination support staff within companies will be able to schedule examinations, receive and respond to information requests, and receive completed examination reports.  Further, such staff also will be able to access the licensee’s company NMLS record, which should decrease regulator requests for additional information throughout the course of an examination. How the system will work outside the examination context is yet to be seen.

CSBS has announced a pilot of the SES system with 11 agencies and nine mortgage or money servicer examinations.  The pilot is scheduled to run from October 1 to December 31, 2019.  Assuming that the pilot program runs smoothly, CSBS expects to make SES available nationwide early in 2020.

Takeaways

The CSBS should be commended for taking this initiative to modernize the supervision process and make it less burdensome for non-bank financial institutions and regulators alike.  Companies should keep an eye out for training on this new system in the not-so-distant future.

CFPB Rules Permit Qualified Mortgage “Cures”

A&B Abstract:

What happens when a proposed qualified mortgage is later discovered to have points and fees in excess of the statutory threshold?  The answer lies in a cure provision scheduled to sunset on January 21, 2021.

 CFPB Rules Permit Qualified Mortgage “Cures”

What happens to an originator or assignee of a “qualified mortgage” who discovers after the loan has been consummated that the points and fees charged in connection with the transaction exceed the permitted 3% threshold?  Such a change not only jeopardizes the QM status of the loan, but also prevents the mortgage from being considered a “qualified residential mortgage” (and, therefore, from being exempt from risk retention requirements) if it is intended to be securitized.  Is the loan irrevocably relegated to non-QM and non-QRM status?  Under certain circumstances, the answer is “no”.

A little-known provision in the CFPB’s qualified mortgage/ability-to-repay rules provides a “cure” for loans consummated before January 10, 2021.  When the creditor or assignee determines after consummation that the transaction’s total points and fees exceed the applicable limit (in most situations, 3% of the total loan amount), the creditor or assignee may “cure” the error and preserve and the QM status of the loan.

The “cure” is available if the following conditions are met:

  • Within 210 days of consummation, the creditor or assignee refunds the excess fees to the borrower;
  • The loan otherwise complies with the other QM requirements;
  • The loan is not 60 days past due;
  • The borrower has not instituted an action in connection with the loan or apprised the creditor, assignee or servicer that the points and fees exceed the applicable threshold; and
  • The creditor or assignee, as applicable, maintains and follows policies and procedures for post-consummation review of the points and fees charged to borrowers.

The Take Away       

This “cure” provision is a valuable tool for creditors and their assignees and may be used under the circumstances described above to salvage the QM and QRM status of a mortgage loan.  However, this limited “cure” provision does not remedy other errors that could jeopardize the loan’s QM status, such as failure to adhere to Appendix Q underwriting standards.

In order to take advantage of this cure provision, it is imperative that creditors and their assignees develop post-closing quality control mechanisms to ensure that the points and fees charged in connection with loans intended to be QMs do not exceed the prescribed thresholds.   Note, however, that unless extended, this cure mechanism sunsets on January 21, 2021.

A Closer Look at the CFPB’s Proposed Debt Collection Rules – Part Four: Other Conduct Provisions

A&B Abstract

This blog post is part four of a five-part series examining the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (the “CFPB” or “Bureau”) proposed rule amending Regulation F (“Proposed Rule”), which implements the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) to prescribe rules governing the activities of debt collectors.

In part one of this series, we provided a brief overview of the FDCPA and the Proposed Rule’s most impactful provisions.  In part two, we summarized the key provisions of the Proposed Rule relating to debt collector communications with consumers.  In part three, we summarized the key provisions of the Proposed Rule relating to debt collectors’ disclosures to consumers.  This post summarizes certain additional conduct provisions under the Proposed Rule.  These include provisions relating to decedent debt, the collection of time-barred debt, credit reporting restrictions, and restrictions on a debt collector’s ability to transfer, sell, or place a debt for collection.

Proposed Provisions Related to Decedent Debt

The FDCPA defines a “consumer” as any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt.  Under the Proposed Rule, this definition would be revised to make clear that a “consumer” includes any natural person, whether living or deceased, obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt.  In addition, for purposes of the Proposed Rule’s provisions regarding communications in connection with debt collection (proposed section 1006.6) and the prohibition on communicating through a medium of communication that the consumer has requested the debt collector not use (proposed section 1006.14(h)), proposed section 1006.6(a)(5) would interpret FDCPA section 805(d)’s definition of the term consumer to include:

  1. The consumer’s spouse;
  2. The consumer’s parent, if the consumer is a minor;
  3. The consumer’s legal guardian;
  4. The executor or administrator of the consumer’s estate, if the consumer is deceased; and
  5. A confirmed successor in interest, as defined in Regulation X, 12 CFR 1024.31, and Regulation Z, 12 CFR 1026.2(a)(27)(ii).

Under Regulations X and Z, a successor in interest is a person to whom a borrower transfers an ownership interest either in a property securing a mortgage loan subject to subpart C of Regulation X, or in a dwelling securing a closed-end consumer credit transaction under Regulation Z, provided that the transfer is:

  1. A transfer by devise, descent, or operation of law on the death of a joint tenant or tenant by the entirety;
  2. A transfer to a relative resulting from the death of a borrower;
  3. A transfer where the spouse or children of the borrower become an owner of the property;
  4. A transfer resulting from a decree of a dissolution of marriage, legal separation agreement, or from an incidental property settlement agreement, by which the spouse of the borrower becomes an owner of the property; or
  5. A transfer into an inter vivos trust in which the borrower is and remains a beneficiary and which does not relate to a transfer of rights of occupancy in the property.

A confirmed successor in interest, in turn, means a successor in interest whose identity, and ownership interest in the relevant property type, have been confirmed by the servicer of the loan.

The Bureau has previously explained that the word “includes” in FDCPA section 805(d) indicates that section 805(d) is an exemplary, rather than an exhaustive, list of the categories of individuals who are consumers for purposes of that section. The Bureau has further explained that, “given their relationship to the individual who owes or allegedly owes the debt, confirmed successors in interest are—like the narrow categories of persons enumerated in FDCPA section 805(d)—the type of individuals with whom a debt collector needs to communicate about the debt.”  The Bureau is seeking comment on the proposed definition of “consumer” under section 1006.6(a)(5), including on the benefits and risks of communications about debts between debt collectors and confirmed successors in interest.

In addition, proposed comment 6(a)(4) would clarify that the terms “executor or administrator” also include the personal representative of the consumer’s estate.  The proposed commentary would explain that a personal representative is any person who is authorized to act on behalf of the deceased consumer’s estate.  Persons with such authority may include personal representatives under the informal probate and summary administration procedures of many states, persons appointed as universal successors, persons who sign declarations or affidavits to effectuate the transfer of estate assets, and persons who dispose of the deceased consumer’s assets extrajudicially.

The proposed comment would adapt the general description of the term personal representative from Regulation Z, 12 CFR 1026.11(c), comment 11(c)-1 (persons “authorized to act on behalf of the estate”) rather than the general description found in the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) Policy Statement on Decedent Debt (persons with the “authority to pay the decedent’s debts from the assets of the decedent’s estate.”). The Bureau has indicated that it believes this change is non-substantive. The Bureau is requesting comment on the scope of the definition of personal representative in proposed comment 6(a)(4)-1 and on any ambiguity in the illustrative descriptions of personal representatives.  Interested stakeholders should consider the potential operational challenges associated with validating and documenting whether a person is in fact the personal representative of a deceased consumer’s estate, given that disclosure regarding a consumer’s debt to the wrong person could result in a prohibited third-party disclosure.  Thus, debt collectors and other industry stakeholders should determine whether additional guidance from the Bureau is needed.

In addition, we note proposed section 1006.18’s general prohibition against false, deceptive, or misleading representations, which the Bureau has indicated would apply to express or implied misrepresentations that a personal representative is liable for the deceased consumer’s debts.  The Bureau is requesting comment on whether the general prohibition against false, deceptive, or misleading representations in proposed section 1006.18 is sufficient to protect individuals who communicate with debt collectors about a deceased consumer’s debts, or whether affirmative disclosures in the decedent debt context are needed.

Proposed Provisions Regulating the Collection of Time-Barred Debts

Under current law, multiple courts have held that suits and threats of suit on time-barred debt violate the FDCPA, reasoning that such practices violate FDCPA section 807’s prohibition on false or misleading representations, FDCPA section 808’s prohibition on unfair practices, or both.  The FTC has similarly concluded that the FDCPA bars actual and threatened suits on time-barred debt.

Nevertheless, the Bureau has indicated that its enforcement experience suggests that some debt collectors may continue to sue or threaten to sue on time-barred debts.  Furthermore, in response to its Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, issued in November 2013, the Bureau indicated that some consumer advocacy groups and State Attorneys General observed that consumers are often uncertain about their rights concerning time-barred debt and that those observations have been borne out by the Bureau’s own consumer testing.

Consequently, the Proposed Rule would interpret FDCPA section 807 to provide that a debt collector must not bring or threaten to bring a legal action against a consumer to collect a debt that the debt collector “knows or should know” is a time-barred debt because such suits and threats of suit explicitly or implicitly misrepresent, and may cause consumers to believe, that the debts are legally enforceable. The Bureau has indicated that the Proposed Rule “may provide debt collectors with greater certainty as to what the law prohibits while also protecting consumers and enabling them to prove legal violations without having to litigate in each case whether lawsuits and threats of lawsuits on time-barred debt violate the FDCPA.”  However, it is unclear how the “knows or should know” standard will be applied.  The Bureau appears to have acknowledged as much, indicating that “sometimes [it] may be difficult…to determine whether a ‘know or should have known’ standard has been met” and that “[s]uch uncertainty could increase litigation costs and make enforcement of proposed section 1006.26(b) more difficult.”  Therefore, the Bureau has specifically requested comment on using a “knows or should know” standard in proposed section 1006.26(b) as well as on the advantages of using a strict liability standard in its place.

While it is notable that the Bureau did not take the additional step of prohibiting the collection of time-barred debt in a non-judicial setting, it has indicated that it is “likely to propose that debt collectors must provide disclosures to consumers when collecting time-barred debts.” The Bureau has indicated that it is currently completing its evaluation of “whether consumers take away from non-litigation collection efforts that they can or may be sued on a debt and, if so, whether that take-away changes depending on the age of the debt.” The Bureau is also evaluating how a time-barred debt disclosure might affect consumers’ understanding of whether debts can be revived. Specifically, the Bureau is considering disclosures that would inform a consumer that, because of the age of the debt, the debt collector cannot sue to recover it, and would also include, where applicable, a disclosure that would inform a consumer that the right to sue on a time-barred debt can be revived in certain circumstances.

The Bureau has indicated that it plans to conduct additional consumer testing of possible time-barred debt and revival disclosures to further inform its evaluation of any time-barred debt disclosures. The Bureau intends to issue a report on such testing and any disclosure proposals related to the collection of time-barred debt and will provide stakeholders with an opportunity to comment on such testing if the Bureau does in fact intend to use it to support disclosure requirements in a final rule.

Proposed Restrictions on Credit Reporting

The Bureau noted that some debt collectors engage in so-called “passive” collections by furnishing information to consumer reporting agencies without first communicating with consumers.  Accordingly, in order to mitigate the perceived harm that a consumer may suffer if a debt collector furnishes information to a consumer reporting agency without first communicating with the consumer, proposed section 1006.30(a) would prohibit a debt collector from furnishing information regarding a debt to a consumer reporting agency before communicating with the consumer about the debt.

In addition, the Bureau noted that during the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (“SBREFA”) process, industry stakeholders expressed concern over the potential burden associated with documenting, such as by using certified mail, that a consumer received a communication and recommended that the Bureau consider clarifying the type of communication that would be sufficient to satisfy the requirement, including clarifying that debt collectors do not need to send the validation notice by certified mail.

To address the recommendation that came out of the SBREFA process, the Bureau is proposing comment 30(a)-1.  In particular, proposed comment 30(a)-1 would clarify that a debt collector would satisfy proposed section 1006.30(a)’s requirement to communicate if the debt collector conveyed information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to the consumer through any medium, but a debt collector would not satisfy the communication requirement if the debt collector attempted to communicate with the consumer but no communication occurred.  By way of example, a debt collector would be considered to have communicated with the consumer if the debt collector provides a validation notice to the consumer, but a debt collector would not be considered to have communicated with the consumer by leaving a limited-content message for the consumer.

The Bureau is seeking comment on proposed section 1006.30(a) and its related commentary.  In light of the record retention requirements that would be imposed under the Proposed Rule—which would require a debt collector to retain evidence of compliance with the Proposed Rule for three years—debt collectors and other industry stakeholders should consider whether additional guidance is needed regarding the level of documentation or other evidence of compliance needed to satisfy proposed section 1006.30(a) and the record retention requirements under proposed section 1006.100.

Proposed Provisions Governing Transfers of Debt

In promulgating the Proposed Rule, the Bureau noted that the “sale, transfer, and placement for collection of debts that have been paid or settled or discharged in bankruptcy, or that are subject to an identity report creates risk of consumer harm.”  Specifically, if a debt is paid or settled, or discharged in bankruptcy, the debt is either extinguished or uncollectible, and if a debt is listed on an identity theft report, the debt likely resulted from fraud, in which case the consumer may not have a legal obligation to repay it.

The Bureau has noted that when the FDCPA became law, debt sales and related transfers were uncommon. However, in more recent years, debt sales and transfers have become more frequent. As a result, the Bureau has noted that the “general growth in debt sales and transfers may have increased the likelihood that a debt that has been paid, settled, or discharged in bankruptcy may be transferred or sold.”  Additionally, identity theft may increase the number of debts that are created if consumers’ identities are stolen and their personal information is misused.

To address these perceived risks, proposed section 1006.30(b)(1)(i) generally would prohibit a debt collector from selling, transferring, or placing for collection a debt if the debt collector “knows or should know” that the debt has been paid or settled, discharged in bankruptcy, or that an identity theft report has been filed with respect to the debt.

Moreover, with respect to a debt collector that is collecting a consumer financial product or service debt, proposed section 1006.30(b)(ii) would identify as an unfair act or practice under Dodd-Frank the sale, transfer, or placement for collection of such debt.

The Proposed Rule would provide an exemption from this general prohibition for transfers made to the debt’s owner.  The Bureau is also proposing the following three additional exemptions that parallel the exemptions found in the Fair Credit Reporting Act, including:

  1. Transferring the debt to a previous owner of the debt if transfer is authorized under the terms of the original contract between the debt collector and the previous owner;
  2. Securitizing the debt or pledging a portfolio of such debt as collateral in connection with a borrowing; or
  3. Transferring the debt as a result of a merger, acquisition, purchase and assumption transaction, or transfer of substantially all of the debt collector’s assets.

The Bureau is seeking comment on several issues related to this proposal, including:

  • On whether additional categories of debt, such as debt currently subject to litigation and debt lacking clear evidence of ownership, should be included in any prohibition adopted in a final rule;
  • On how frequently consumers identify a specific debt when filing an identity theft report, and on how frequently debt collectors learn that an identity theft report was filed in error and proceed to sell or transfer the debt;
  • On any potential disruptions that proposed section 1006.30(b)(1)(i) would cause for secured debts, such as by preventing servicing transfers or foreclosure activity related to mortgage loans; and
  • On whether any of the currently proposed categories of debts should be clarified and, if so, how; and on whether additional clarification is needed regarding the proposed “know or should know” standard.

Takeaway

While the Bureau appears to be cognizant of the potential compliance issues associated with several of the aforementioned provisions of the Proposed Rule, it is unclear how the “knows or should know” standard will be interpreted and enforced or whether the standard will result in more litigation than otherwise anticipated.  Accordingly, debt collectors and other industry stakeholders should consider commenting on these and other provisions of the Proposed Rule.

 

Recent Cases Deepen the Divide Among Circuits on Standing to Sue for Violations of FACTA

A&B Abstract:

Recent cases by the Eleventh Circuit and the D.C. Circuit deepen the divide among the courts on the standing of consumers to sue for violations of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (“FACTA”).  In Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 922 F.3d 1175 (11th Cir. 2019) and Jeffries v. Volume Services of America, 2019 WL 2750856 (D.C. Cir. July 2, 2019), the courts of appeal have held that the consumer plaintiff had Article III standing under the Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins to sue retailers for violation of FACTA’s truncation requirement.  FACTA prohibits retailers from printing “more than the last 5 digits of the credit card number or the expiration date” on the consumer’s receipt.  Prior decisions from the Second, Third, Seventh and Ninth Circuits held that the consumer plaintiff lacked standing to sue the retailer for a violation of FACTA’s truncation requirement absent a resulting tangible injury.

Discussion:

In Muransky, the Eleventh Circuit recently vacated and reissued an earlier ruling holding that a plaintiff had standing under Spokeo to pursue a putative class action for violation of FACTA’s truncation requirement.  In Muransky, the retailer printed a receipt with the plaintiff’s first six and last four digits of his credit card.  After a short period of discovery, the parties settled the case for $6.3 million.  During the approval process, a class member objected to the settlement on the basis that the plaintiff suffered no harm, and class members who had their identities stolen would have their claims barred.  After the district court approved the settlement, the objector appealed.

On appeal, in addition to the objector’s challenge, an amicus brief was filed on behalf of the National Retail Federation, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the International Franchise Association.  These groups argued that plaintiff’s lawyers had “weaponized” FACTA in recent years to force defendants to settle class actions “despite the absence of any actual harm or risk of harm.”  The groups noted recent, significant FACTA class action settlements in the Eleventh Circuit ranging from $2.5 million to $30.9 million.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s approval of the settlement, and rejected the challenge to the plaintiff’s standing.  The court recognized that prior courts in the Second, Third, Seventh and Ninth Circuits had held that consumers lacked standing to pursue lawsuits for violation of FACTA’s truncation requirement, absent some tangible injury.  In Kamal v. J. Crew Group, Inc., 918, F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 2019), the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the consumer’s putative class action.  The Third Circuit held that printing the first six and last four digits of the credit card, without any additional degree of risk, was “a bare procedural violation” that does not create Article III standing.

The decision in Kamal was consistent with prior decisions from the Second Circuit (Crupar-Weinmann v. Paris Baguette Am., Inc., 861 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017)), Seventh Circuit (Meyers v. Nicolet Restaurant of De Pere, LLC, 843 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2016)), and Ninth Circuit (Bassett v. ABM Parking Services, Inc., 883 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2018)).  Each of those cases involved a violation of the FACTA truncation requirement involving the printing of the credit card expiration date on the receipt.  In each case, the court held that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue.

Even more recently, in Jeffries, the D.C. Circuit followed the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit in Muransky to reverse the district court’s dismissal of a consumer’s putative class action for violation of FACTA’s truncation requirement on standing grounds.  In that case, the retailer had printed all 16 digits of the plaintiff’s credit card number and the expiration date of the card on the receipt.  These facts were important because the D.C. Circuit recognized that “not every violation of FACTA’s truncation requirement creates a risk of identity theft” sufficient to constitute a concrete injury in fact.  The court specifically cited with approval the expiration date cases from the Second, Seventh and Ninth Circuits, noting that the mere technical violation of printing the expiration date did not create a risk of identity theft triggering a concrete injury in fact.  However, the D.C. Circuit held that the “egregious” FACTA violation of printing all 16 digits and the expiration date created a real risk of harm to the plaintiff because it provided all of the information necessary for a criminal to defraud the plaintiff.

Takeaways:

First, the procedural posture of Muransky and the “egregious” facts in Jeffries may have helped lead to their respective results.

In Muransky, the retailer did not challenge the plaintiff’s standing in the district court.  Rather, the standing challenge came from an objector to the settlement of the putative class action.  Thousands of class members had already made claims in the settlement, and the court was likely disinclined to unwind such a settlement due to a single objector.  Regardless, Muransky is nonetheless the law in the Eleventh Circuit, and district courts will be bound to follow it.  Muransky will only increase the already significant number of FACTA class actions brought in that jurisdiction.

In Jeffries, the retailer had printed all 16 digits of the plaintiff’s credit card number and the expiration date of the card on the receipt.  In finding standing, the D.C. Circuit noted the “egregious” nature of the FACTA violation.  Therefore, less “egregious” violations of FACTA can be distinguished from Jeffries, such that the D.C. Circuit may not necessarily become a safe haven for FACTA lawsuits.

Second, the divide among the courts of appeal continues to justify the Supreme Court clarifying the scope of Spokeo.